...Notes:
1. scroll down to see earlier posts.
2. I'd love to hear your feedback... or suggested topics... via the Contact page. Thanks.
1. scroll down to see earlier posts.
2. I'd love to hear your feedback... or suggested topics... via the Contact page. Thanks.
08/01/2019
AGITPROP in the 2016 Elections – Part 4
Conspiracy Theory?
Notes:
AGITPROP in the 2016 Elections – Part 4
Conspiracy Theory?
Notes:
- My apologies for the length this time. I debated breaking it in two; I hope you’ll not lapse into a sleep coma.
- Any and all errors contained within are solely mine, and cannot be attributed to sources who’ve contributed to this body of knowledge over time.
Let’s take a look at a realistic scenario…
But first, a word from one of our sponsors, a note from STATISTICS:
Prior to 2016, the popular vote lost to the Electoral College three times (1824 isn’t included since it was decided by Congressional vote). A plethora of statistics can be run on the numbers and interpreted as one will; short of a postdoctoral forensic analysis, any other statistical interpretation is skewed and filled with bias. I’ll stay away from statistics in this final part, although I will say I’ve looked at them and they can be taken in either direction.
The conclusion I’d draw from the three electoral victories is that: it’s possible, albeit rare, for a popular vote to be beaten by our electoral system. This may seem an overly obvious statement, but it’s germane if I look at it from the perspective of a hostile intelligence service—HOIS—i.e., it’s not impossible, which may present an opportunity.
So, if I were Mikhail Fradkov, SVR Director from 2007 to 20016, and I have my directorate heads from Line PR—Political Intelligence, Line S—Illegals, and Line I—Computer Services, with me on a visit to Putin at one of his dachas—not certain whether it would have been in Sochi or Saint Petersburg. At any rate, they’re a group of very smart and cunning people with deep expertise in the field of intelligence. Over a case of vodka—Putin sticks with his beet juice—along with some others from Putin’s inner circle, Fradkov presents his ‘What-If’. Except it’s more than that. Of the more than 100 senior Russian officials under personal sanction by the U.S. at the time, it includes nine of Putin’s inner circle… not to mention the heads of the SVR, FSB and GRU. It’s straightforward to realize that there’s great motive among such a power elite to act. And since they’re Russians, ‘act’ doesn’t mean retreat from Crimea and Eastern Ukraine—the reason for much of the personal sanctions. It means ‘act’ against the United States.
No stretch of reason so far…
They can’t really attack on an economic front or technological front—obvious reasons—which leaves political and social arenas as their areas of leverage. And it just so happens, Russia’s strengths in political and social espionage coincide in time with U.S. divisions and discord in both political and social dimensions. It’s more than just my personal opinion: Russia loves discord; it allows their opportunism and manipulative skills to bear fruit for them. So, as Fradkov and his comrades present their ‘More-Than-What-If’: a proposal to interfere in the 2016 Presidential election, it finds very receptive ears.
It’s also easy to see the largest icebergs that floated towards us:
Once their decision to mount a campaign is reached, Russian intel is able to mobilize very quickly; they’re doing what they’ve always done: setting up front orgs; tasking their illegals and injecting more; ramping up their psyops apparatus; and utilizing targeted computer hacking to gather inside info and data.
It’s still just 2013/2014 at this point. Okay, if I haven’t put you to sleep by now, let’s continue. A quick note, first, on my use of the AGITPROP campaign being a ‘What-If.’ I don’t believe Russian intel could have been confident of success, prior to the operation; there’s just no way they could have known how effective their efforts would be from an a priori view. We’ll see how they might have felt later on.
As we’ve covered earlier, analytical research is the basis for psyops. And… there’s no shortage of political polling data, quite the opposite. Over time, some U.S. entities also provide confidential polling data, but the Russians can also hack commercial computer systems very well, and mine craploads [technical intel term]. In addition, commercial computers aren’t (TEMPEST) shielded against electromagnetic eavesdropping—a huge vulnerability (we weren’t even allowed to use TEMPESTed systems in our embassies in Warsaw Pact countries during the Cold War; the tech threat was/is that advanced).
The head of Line I—Computer Services—was at the Putin-insider meeting because he would have been able to answer confidently how Russia would be able to effectively crunch the massive, massive data sets which would be involved. RU has supercomputers as well as the West and very advanced computer scientists. The type of applications used include constrained optimizations, sensitivity analyses, simulations, and statistical & econometric forecasting (I was educated on all of these when I did my MBA twenty years ago).
But wait. How do they crack the nut of figuring out where to target their efforts, in such a complex country as the U.S.? Almost 200M voters, 50 states, 3,142 counties, and almost 175,000 voting precincts.
I have a decision analysis that comes to a whittled-down target set. I won’t bore you with it, but if you want to see it, just hit me up on the Contact Page.
One important decision, however, is deciding the level of target set. Counties end up working best, because efforts can be concentrated on a focused set, each county has its own government, officials and issues from which key communicators and organizations can be identified for influence.
Just like for domestic campaign pollers, critical areas are identified: battleground states and, within each, the battleground areas. This comes down to approx. 179 counties across Florida, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. That’s five AGITPROP teams targeting an average of 38 counties each. Doable, especially with effective hacking and computer science, and maturing expertise in social media influence.
This gives Russia the data for an effective psyop campaign: granular voter demographics; key voting issues; key communicators and organizations; and specific social media channels.
Maskirovka in their AGITPROP campaigns comes from front orgs and individuals, etc., etc.; as detailed in Part 2. Obvious ones like the Internet Research Agency (over 1K employees, funded by a Putin insider), and Elena Yurevna Semenova; this list of known and unknown ones goes on and on.
What are the most important, specific messages, the Dezinformatsija? Well, it varies by target demographic but almost always uses fear-up messaging, to hit our vulnerabilities of polarization and social/economic distress. Three overarching message sets accomplish the following: sway as many ‘undecideds’ as possible; increase agitation to motivate higher turnout of those who will vote for the candidate Russia wants; and, in the same voting areas, reassure the Clinton voters that her win is an easy one, a ‘given’, she’s a shoe-in… well, if such is the case maybe I don’t need to go out and vote.
Now we come to the fourth pillar of AGITPROP: Active Measures. I believe the IC now classifies the entire offensive social media campaign as Active Measures. This seems hyperbole to me, at least as presented by the press: active measures are (or were) discrete activities injected at a specific point in an operation for decisive reaction. Things like wet work: attempted assassination of a Pope, polonium poisoning, etc.
In the case of 2016, I observed a rather interesting active measure… interesting because it amounted to a diversion. Russia actively attempted to hack into some actual voting systems. If I wanted to distract the U.S. from mounting an effective defense against my AGITPROP campaign, I’d target a much more sensitive pressure point. Attack the actual voting infrastructure and I can get my enemy to concentrate their assets in that direction, making them more vulnerable to my AGITPROP; they don’t have resources for everything.
The rest is history. Or not.
In conclusion: Russia had MEANS, MOTIVE and OPPORTUNITY, in addition to almost no down-side and lots of possible up-side.
Note: my analysis and this scenario is obviously post facto; it’s easier to see the spoor after it’s been dropped rather than predict it. I’ve operated at national levels and seen the Russians up close, enough to know specifics as well as tendencies. Either that or I am just being a conspiracy theorist. Regardless, if I can sniff things out after the fact, I believe those much smarter, cunning, and expert than me could design a campaign before the fact.
It’s possibly enough to know that all our Intelligence Community, including dedicated investigations, concluded the Russians interfered in our elections in a ‘sweeping and systematic’ fashion. That’s not enough though: the conclusions don’t address what effect or impact the Russian’s efforts had. Two final comments: I’m violating my promise to eschew statistics… the three earlier electoral victories had popular victories for the opposing party of 0.9%, 0.25%, and 0.5% of voters that turned out; in 2016 it was over 2.0%—it reflects the degree of division in the country, effectiveness of Russian AGITPROP, or both. And second: if the Russians did sway our 2016 election, it means the result was not legitimate; even if we had incontrovertible forensic proof of such, it would be a huge risk to make that public… the resultant constitutional crisis would cause massive national security damage to our Republic.
I’m the first to admit I have no way of knowing; but I do know they very well Russia could have. For those without direct experience with the them, I hope my diatribe at least gives people a better idea of their nature and respect for their abilities in certain areas.
THANKS FOR READING!! For more: Ben Daniels gets involved first-hand, from time to time.
Phew! Too much fun.
Note: please feel free to comment, provide feedback or suggest a topic via the Contact Page. Thanks.
But first, a word from one of our sponsors, a note from STATISTICS:
Prior to 2016, the popular vote lost to the Electoral College three times (1824 isn’t included since it was decided by Congressional vote). A plethora of statistics can be run on the numbers and interpreted as one will; short of a postdoctoral forensic analysis, any other statistical interpretation is skewed and filled with bias. I’ll stay away from statistics in this final part, although I will say I’ve looked at them and they can be taken in either direction.
The conclusion I’d draw from the three electoral victories is that: it’s possible, albeit rare, for a popular vote to be beaten by our electoral system. This may seem an overly obvious statement, but it’s germane if I look at it from the perspective of a hostile intelligence service—HOIS—i.e., it’s not impossible, which may present an opportunity.
So, if I were Mikhail Fradkov, SVR Director from 2007 to 20016, and I have my directorate heads from Line PR—Political Intelligence, Line S—Illegals, and Line I—Computer Services, with me on a visit to Putin at one of his dachas—not certain whether it would have been in Sochi or Saint Petersburg. At any rate, they’re a group of very smart and cunning people with deep expertise in the field of intelligence. Over a case of vodka—Putin sticks with his beet juice—along with some others from Putin’s inner circle, Fradkov presents his ‘What-If’. Except it’s more than that. Of the more than 100 senior Russian officials under personal sanction by the U.S. at the time, it includes nine of Putin’s inner circle… not to mention the heads of the SVR, FSB and GRU. It’s straightforward to realize that there’s great motive among such a power elite to act. And since they’re Russians, ‘act’ doesn’t mean retreat from Crimea and Eastern Ukraine—the reason for much of the personal sanctions. It means ‘act’ against the United States.
No stretch of reason so far…
They can’t really attack on an economic front or technological front—obvious reasons—which leaves political and social arenas as their areas of leverage. And it just so happens, Russia’s strengths in political and social espionage coincide in time with U.S. divisions and discord in both political and social dimensions. It’s more than just my personal opinion: Russia loves discord; it allows their opportunism and manipulative skills to bear fruit for them. So, as Fradkov and his comrades present their ‘More-Than-What-If’: a proposal to interfere in the 2016 Presidential election, it finds very receptive ears.
It’s also easy to see the largest icebergs that floated towards us:
- Russian has great expertise in political and social espionage, not to mention AGITPROP;
- Their expertise in manipulating regions of discord is broad and deep, and aligns with our polarized political system and social environment;
- There’s very little downside for Russia to execute a comprehensive AGITPROP campaign; one major factor being that the West was facing decreasing marginal benefit from additional sanctions;
- There could be great upside for them should they succeed in an AGITPROP campaign targeting our elections. (Just like we do, RU intel conducts deep psychological analyses of political leaders—doctors examining walk, posture, wrinkles in front of ears, etc., neuro linguists to analyze speech patterns, change of enunciation over time… etc., etc. From this they reliably conclude how someone will behave and how they’ll react to specific types of situations, their vulnerabilities… everything); and
- Don’t forget, there’s strong personal animus from the top Russian leaders and insiders to exact revenge for the personal sanctions.
Once their decision to mount a campaign is reached, Russian intel is able to mobilize very quickly; they’re doing what they’ve always done: setting up front orgs; tasking their illegals and injecting more; ramping up their psyops apparatus; and utilizing targeted computer hacking to gather inside info and data.
It’s still just 2013/2014 at this point. Okay, if I haven’t put you to sleep by now, let’s continue. A quick note, first, on my use of the AGITPROP campaign being a ‘What-If.’ I don’t believe Russian intel could have been confident of success, prior to the operation; there’s just no way they could have known how effective their efforts would be from an a priori view. We’ll see how they might have felt later on.
As we’ve covered earlier, analytical research is the basis for psyops. And… there’s no shortage of political polling data, quite the opposite. Over time, some U.S. entities also provide confidential polling data, but the Russians can also hack commercial computer systems very well, and mine craploads [technical intel term]. In addition, commercial computers aren’t (TEMPEST) shielded against electromagnetic eavesdropping—a huge vulnerability (we weren’t even allowed to use TEMPESTed systems in our embassies in Warsaw Pact countries during the Cold War; the tech threat was/is that advanced).
The head of Line I—Computer Services—was at the Putin-insider meeting because he would have been able to answer confidently how Russia would be able to effectively crunch the massive, massive data sets which would be involved. RU has supercomputers as well as the West and very advanced computer scientists. The type of applications used include constrained optimizations, sensitivity analyses, simulations, and statistical & econometric forecasting (I was educated on all of these when I did my MBA twenty years ago).
But wait. How do they crack the nut of figuring out where to target their efforts, in such a complex country as the U.S.? Almost 200M voters, 50 states, 3,142 counties, and almost 175,000 voting precincts.
I have a decision analysis that comes to a whittled-down target set. I won’t bore you with it, but if you want to see it, just hit me up on the Contact Page.
One important decision, however, is deciding the level of target set. Counties end up working best, because efforts can be concentrated on a focused set, each county has its own government, officials and issues from which key communicators and organizations can be identified for influence.
Just like for domestic campaign pollers, critical areas are identified: battleground states and, within each, the battleground areas. This comes down to approx. 179 counties across Florida, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. That’s five AGITPROP teams targeting an average of 38 counties each. Doable, especially with effective hacking and computer science, and maturing expertise in social media influence.
This gives Russia the data for an effective psyop campaign: granular voter demographics; key voting issues; key communicators and organizations; and specific social media channels.
Maskirovka in their AGITPROP campaigns comes from front orgs and individuals, etc., etc.; as detailed in Part 2. Obvious ones like the Internet Research Agency (over 1K employees, funded by a Putin insider), and Elena Yurevna Semenova; this list of known and unknown ones goes on and on.
What are the most important, specific messages, the Dezinformatsija? Well, it varies by target demographic but almost always uses fear-up messaging, to hit our vulnerabilities of polarization and social/economic distress. Three overarching message sets accomplish the following: sway as many ‘undecideds’ as possible; increase agitation to motivate higher turnout of those who will vote for the candidate Russia wants; and, in the same voting areas, reassure the Clinton voters that her win is an easy one, a ‘given’, she’s a shoe-in… well, if such is the case maybe I don’t need to go out and vote.
Now we come to the fourth pillar of AGITPROP: Active Measures. I believe the IC now classifies the entire offensive social media campaign as Active Measures. This seems hyperbole to me, at least as presented by the press: active measures are (or were) discrete activities injected at a specific point in an operation for decisive reaction. Things like wet work: attempted assassination of a Pope, polonium poisoning, etc.
In the case of 2016, I observed a rather interesting active measure… interesting because it amounted to a diversion. Russia actively attempted to hack into some actual voting systems. If I wanted to distract the U.S. from mounting an effective defense against my AGITPROP campaign, I’d target a much more sensitive pressure point. Attack the actual voting infrastructure and I can get my enemy to concentrate their assets in that direction, making them more vulnerable to my AGITPROP; they don’t have resources for everything.
The rest is history. Or not.
In conclusion: Russia had MEANS, MOTIVE and OPPORTUNITY, in addition to almost no down-side and lots of possible up-side.
Note: my analysis and this scenario is obviously post facto; it’s easier to see the spoor after it’s been dropped rather than predict it. I’ve operated at national levels and seen the Russians up close, enough to know specifics as well as tendencies. Either that or I am just being a conspiracy theorist. Regardless, if I can sniff things out after the fact, I believe those much smarter, cunning, and expert than me could design a campaign before the fact.
It’s possibly enough to know that all our Intelligence Community, including dedicated investigations, concluded the Russians interfered in our elections in a ‘sweeping and systematic’ fashion. That’s not enough though: the conclusions don’t address what effect or impact the Russian’s efforts had. Two final comments: I’m violating my promise to eschew statistics… the three earlier electoral victories had popular victories for the opposing party of 0.9%, 0.25%, and 0.5% of voters that turned out; in 2016 it was over 2.0%—it reflects the degree of division in the country, effectiveness of Russian AGITPROP, or both. And second: if the Russians did sway our 2016 election, it means the result was not legitimate; even if we had incontrovertible forensic proof of such, it would be a huge risk to make that public… the resultant constitutional crisis would cause massive national security damage to our Republic.
I’m the first to admit I have no way of knowing; but I do know they very well Russia could have. For those without direct experience with the them, I hope my diatribe at least gives people a better idea of their nature and respect for their abilities in certain areas.
THANKS FOR READING!! For more: Ben Daniels gets involved first-hand, from time to time.
Phew! Too much fun.
Note: please feel free to comment, provide feedback or suggest a topic via the Contact Page. Thanks.
07/16/2019
AGITPROP in the 2016 Elections – Part 3
Maskirovka and Dezinformatsija
Notes:
Part One introduced agitprop and presented its four main components: Psychological Operations; Maskirovka; Dezinformatsija; and sometimes Active Measures.
Part Two covered Psychological Operations.
Let’s now take a look at Russian use of Maskirovka and Dezinformatsija in our 2016 Elections.
AGITPROP in the 2016 Elections – Part 3
Maskirovka and Dezinformatsija
Notes:
- In the interests of transparency, please see my note at the end about my ‘political affiliation.’
- Any and all errors contained within are solely mine, and cannot be attributed to sources who’ve contributed to this body of knowledge over time.
Part One introduced agitprop and presented its four main components: Psychological Operations; Maskirovka; Dezinformatsija; and sometimes Active Measures.
Part Two covered Psychological Operations.
Let’s now take a look at Russian use of Maskirovka and Dezinformatsija in our 2016 Elections.
It’s all about deception, the purpose of deception being two-fold:
The Russians originally incorporated deception as formal military doctrine over a century ago (although their use of it is much older, once it was codified it took on a whole new dimension, and became practiced and refined to an expert discipline). They expanded it into political, social, economic, and cultural doctrine at the beginning of the Cold War… although, no doubt, they’d been using it on their own population since the 1917 revolution.
The specific disciplines of Maskirovka—Concealment—and Disinformation overlap, and are used in a coordinated manner. Some references to Maskirovka label it as ‘deception’ in toto, of which Disinformation is a subordinate part. Regardless, for the purposes of this blog I’d like to treat them separately, in order to highlight two distinct types of warfare art which have been developed for specific aims, to an expert level. As follows:
Maskirovka, as Concealment, for the purposes of AGITPROP or information warfare, means disguising the origin—or source—of the information. As a simplification, it’s the practice of packaging psyop messages such that they appear to be coming from credible sources, even ones of authority. This is an explicit discipline unto itself and includes such things as:
Let’s say a certain demographic across the country relies on Rush Limbaugh and/or Karl Rove for commentary and policy editorials. My organization, let’s use some random acronym and call it SVR, has researched the habits of these two individuals. Well, now I may be able to arrange for one of my agents of influence, inside a highly reputable front organization, or a female Russian emigre lawyer in a PAC or lobby group, to bump into each of them and impart some incendiary information. Or develop a relationship over time and deliver nuanced information that’s part of my psyop campaign targeted at their listeners… tailored to their listeners. Again, to oversimplify: ‘your economic discomfort and unemployment hardship is because of millions of refugees flooding into Texas and the Southwest.’ This message even works for those in that demographic that live in Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, etc.
Now have the message delivered by Limbaugh and Rove (or whoever else, take your pick… influential communicators) be from two ostensibly independent sources. Well, actually only one source: me and my SVR gnomes. But they look like separate independent sources, unrelated, confirming each other. Well, it must be true, and becomes even that much more powerful.
By now, I’m hoping you can see how Disinformation would work in this. Disinformation is the entire set of messages developed from my psyop research, targeted and tailored specifically to influence, building over time, to sway the ‘Undecideds’ and get more of the ‘Decideds’ to act—come out and vote. Disinformation runs the gamut from subtle to blatant, and includes:
When the delivery mechanism of concealed disinformation is geometrically expanded through the use of multiple social media platforms, the effect is geometric as well; I can easily reach almost all of my target. And remember: we love to hear supposed credible sources of authority supporting our views, especially when it bolsters our fight against ‘them.’ Social media sources have become rife and are very difficult to validate.
Maskirovka and Dezinformatsija are used together for effective deception; Russian doctrine long ago codified it formally: ‘Control the Enemy’.
Next time, in our conclusion, we’ll throw in some Active Measures and wrap things up with an integrated example. More fun!
Note: please feel free to comment, provide feedback or suggest a topic via the Contact Page. Thanks.
Political disclaimer: If there was a political party of ‘Conservative Hippies’, I’d be more active myself; it means I have conservative views personally but a very strong ‘Live and Let Live’ belief. I’ll go all the way out on the limb and declare I was one of the Republicans who voted for Hillary.
- To influence people to do things they wouldn’t normally do when faced with reality—to get people to behave other than they usually would; and
- To motivate people to act when they wouldn’t tend to—to rile up people.
The Russians originally incorporated deception as formal military doctrine over a century ago (although their use of it is much older, once it was codified it took on a whole new dimension, and became practiced and refined to an expert discipline). They expanded it into political, social, economic, and cultural doctrine at the beginning of the Cold War… although, no doubt, they’d been using it on their own population since the 1917 revolution.
The specific disciplines of Maskirovka—Concealment—and Disinformation overlap, and are used in a coordinated manner. Some references to Maskirovka label it as ‘deception’ in toto, of which Disinformation is a subordinate part. Regardless, for the purposes of this blog I’d like to treat them separately, in order to highlight two distinct types of warfare art which have been developed for specific aims, to an expert level. As follows:
Maskirovka, as Concealment, for the purposes of AGITPROP or information warfare, means disguising the origin—or source—of the information. As a simplification, it’s the practice of packaging psyop messages such that they appear to be coming from credible sources, even ones of authority. This is an explicit discipline unto itself and includes such things as:
- Front organizations;
- False flags;
- Drones;
- Mules; and
- Cut-outs.
Let’s say a certain demographic across the country relies on Rush Limbaugh and/or Karl Rove for commentary and policy editorials. My organization, let’s use some random acronym and call it SVR, has researched the habits of these two individuals. Well, now I may be able to arrange for one of my agents of influence, inside a highly reputable front organization, or a female Russian emigre lawyer in a PAC or lobby group, to bump into each of them and impart some incendiary information. Or develop a relationship over time and deliver nuanced information that’s part of my psyop campaign targeted at their listeners… tailored to their listeners. Again, to oversimplify: ‘your economic discomfort and unemployment hardship is because of millions of refugees flooding into Texas and the Southwest.’ This message even works for those in that demographic that live in Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, etc.
Now have the message delivered by Limbaugh and Rove (or whoever else, take your pick… influential communicators) be from two ostensibly independent sources. Well, actually only one source: me and my SVR gnomes. But they look like separate independent sources, unrelated, confirming each other. Well, it must be true, and becomes even that much more powerful.
By now, I’m hoping you can see how Disinformation would work in this. Disinformation is the entire set of messages developed from my psyop research, targeted and tailored specifically to influence, building over time, to sway the ‘Undecideds’ and get more of the ‘Decideds’ to act—come out and vote. Disinformation runs the gamut from subtle to blatant, and includes:
- Oversimplification, relying on the path of least resistance ‘black-and-white’ dynamic;
- Exaggeration, let’s throw some gasoline on the fire; and
- Lies that have a kernel of truth at their root, a lie becomes more credible if it’s based on pre-existing fact or truth.
When the delivery mechanism of concealed disinformation is geometrically expanded through the use of multiple social media platforms, the effect is geometric as well; I can easily reach almost all of my target. And remember: we love to hear supposed credible sources of authority supporting our views, especially when it bolsters our fight against ‘them.’ Social media sources have become rife and are very difficult to validate.
Maskirovka and Dezinformatsija are used together for effective deception; Russian doctrine long ago codified it formally: ‘Control the Enemy’.
Next time, in our conclusion, we’ll throw in some Active Measures and wrap things up with an integrated example. More fun!
Note: please feel free to comment, provide feedback or suggest a topic via the Contact Page. Thanks.
Political disclaimer: If there was a political party of ‘Conservative Hippies’, I’d be more active myself; it means I have conservative views personally but a very strong ‘Live and Let Live’ belief. I’ll go all the way out on the limb and declare I was one of the Republicans who voted for Hillary.
07/05/2019
AGITPROP in the 2016 Elections – Part 2
Note: any and all errors contained within are solely mine, and cannot be attributed to sources who’ve contributed to this body of knowledge over time.
Part One introduced agitprop and presented its four main components:
Part Two breaks down Psychological Operations and their application in the real-world.
AGITPROP in the 2016 Elections – Part 2
Note: any and all errors contained within are solely mine, and cannot be attributed to sources who’ve contributed to this body of knowledge over time.
Part One introduced agitprop and presented its four main components:
- Psychological Operations;
- Maskirovka, or camouflage of actions;
- Dezinformatsija, or disinformation;
- Active Measures.
Part Two breaks down Psychological Operations and their application in the real-world.
Psychological Operations are based on deep analyses of a target audience’s traits and behaviors. Much as any marketing department conducts consumer segmentation, research on needs, preferences, even idealistic issues, psyops begin with these analyses too. Marketing research has developed over the past decades into an advanced discipline, itself at the PhD level, to give you an idea of how far psyops has come. Specific to campaigns and elections, the analyses are conducted on complex polling data that are collected, sliced and diced into a myriad of sub-sub-sub-segments, and picked apart to the nth degree. For example, what are the top five election issues for a black, suburban white-collar female of a certain age group versus an unemployed, white middle-aged male miner in West Virginia. And as we’ve all seen, it goes on and on and on. Already on Facebook we’re receiving Issues Surveys being sent by many candidates. What results is a vast ocean of detailed data floating around in our information driven world.
Psychological operators then take advantage of powerful levers of influence to target audiences’ motivators and fears. Such as:
Marketers, pollsters, and agitprop operators use sophisticated and advanced tools, such as data science, psycholinguistics, neurolinguistics, psychoacoustics, and neuroacoustics, the list goes on and on and, yes, there are a good number of high-paid PhD’s doing this, especially in government funded intel agencies with deep black budgets. Have you ever been to one of those bars where they ring a bell every ten minutes or so and everyone drinks; it may be Pavlovian, of course, but the strident tone of the bell is a psychoacoustic stimulus that, when combined with a bar’s group dynamics, results in predictable—more profitable—behavior. Imagine yourself in the bar alone when the bell rings; you’d probably feel silly, maybe even stupid, behaving as the group would.
Psyops in agitprop goes way beyond air dropping leaflets or delivering ten-inch American condoms marked ‘small’. Combine all the methods in the psyops toolbox into a cohesive, holistic, systematic attack and extend it into a population based on exhaustive polling, and the experts in tails-that-wag-the-dog can incent specific, desired behaviors and actions. For Russian Intelligence, with a large army of agitprop operators and a full century of refinement of the craft, it becomes actual information warfare. Then use the broad and deep reach of social media to target almost any audience, and multiplicative effectiveness is achieved.
It’s subtle; it’s all the kind of messaging we’ve gotten used to; we don’t immediately question it, and for segments of the population that are more susceptible to suggestion—hey, everyone likes someone delivering a message that supports their own opinions. The bottom line is this: It can sway those in the undecided column, and can mobilize people to action—coming out to the polls—when they might not act otherwise. We know these are decisive elements in any election.
I was fortunate to be able to take the Psychological Operations Officers Course and it was extremely eye opening. Overlay the dynamics described above on what your data science is telling you are the key states and districts and you can sway an entire election result. Regardless of any individual’s judgment regarding an Electoral College system versus popular vote, the electoral system is vulnerable to the ‘manipulation’ (author’s opinion) that occurred in 2016.
In Part 3 of this commentary, I’ll take a look into the disciplines of Maskirovka and Dezinformatsija—they are used in a coordinated fashion together. The fun continues!
Note: please feel free to comment, provide feedback or suggest a topic via the Contact Page. Thanks.
Psychological operators then take advantage of powerful levers of influence to target audiences’ motivators and fears. Such as:
- Societal polarization—us versus ‘them’ always works fairly well;
- Key communicators or influencers; these are individuals or organizations that hold particular sway over a target audience. Think of a union president, a local Lion’s Chapter, even religious groups.
- Economic discomfort and other critical behavior influencers;
- The effects of group dynamics, usually very powerful, and can induce people to behave in ways they never would as a sole individual, or even family—who screams loudest in a group, on an issue, gets the most attention, recognition, and often popularity; and
- Amplification of messages by traditional media—the news service that ‘simplifies and exaggerates’ the most achieves a higher distribution.
Marketers, pollsters, and agitprop operators use sophisticated and advanced tools, such as data science, psycholinguistics, neurolinguistics, psychoacoustics, and neuroacoustics, the list goes on and on and, yes, there are a good number of high-paid PhD’s doing this, especially in government funded intel agencies with deep black budgets. Have you ever been to one of those bars where they ring a bell every ten minutes or so and everyone drinks; it may be Pavlovian, of course, but the strident tone of the bell is a psychoacoustic stimulus that, when combined with a bar’s group dynamics, results in predictable—more profitable—behavior. Imagine yourself in the bar alone when the bell rings; you’d probably feel silly, maybe even stupid, behaving as the group would.
Psyops in agitprop goes way beyond air dropping leaflets or delivering ten-inch American condoms marked ‘small’. Combine all the methods in the psyops toolbox into a cohesive, holistic, systematic attack and extend it into a population based on exhaustive polling, and the experts in tails-that-wag-the-dog can incent specific, desired behaviors and actions. For Russian Intelligence, with a large army of agitprop operators and a full century of refinement of the craft, it becomes actual information warfare. Then use the broad and deep reach of social media to target almost any audience, and multiplicative effectiveness is achieved.
It’s subtle; it’s all the kind of messaging we’ve gotten used to; we don’t immediately question it, and for segments of the population that are more susceptible to suggestion—hey, everyone likes someone delivering a message that supports their own opinions. The bottom line is this: It can sway those in the undecided column, and can mobilize people to action—coming out to the polls—when they might not act otherwise. We know these are decisive elements in any election.
I was fortunate to be able to take the Psychological Operations Officers Course and it was extremely eye opening. Overlay the dynamics described above on what your data science is telling you are the key states and districts and you can sway an entire election result. Regardless of any individual’s judgment regarding an Electoral College system versus popular vote, the electoral system is vulnerable to the ‘manipulation’ (author’s opinion) that occurred in 2016.
In Part 3 of this commentary, I’ll take a look into the disciplines of Maskirovka and Dezinformatsija—they are used in a coordinated fashion together. The fun continues!
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